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Abstract
Social assistance in Germany reduces the incentive to work. The
U. S. Welfare to Work Programme tries to avoid such
disincentives. It consists essentially of two elements: the Earned
Income Tax Credit (EITC) for employees in low wage occupations
and a Workfare model. The EITC and the Workfare model as
implemented in the State of Wisconsin are described and
analysed. Conclusions for welfare reform in Germany are drawn.







Welfare to Work in the U. S.: A Model for Germany?
1.  Introduction
Welfare reform is on Germany’s political agenda. Besides retirement benefits and health
insurance the basic provision of social security
1 has become increasingly an object of
public interest. One reason for this is the increasing number of social welfare recipients
as well as the increase in expenditure for welfare.  The heavy burden on the state’s fi-
nances caused by German unification has lead to a feeling that welfare has become too
heavy a burden. At the same time it was recognised that by setting a lower limit to
wages, welfare reduces the possibilities of low wage employment. It shifts the wage
structure upwards, makes labour more expensive and limits the demand for workers
with low levels of qualification. And finally it became more and more apparent that
welfare has negative effects on the recipients, particularly with respect to their willing-
ness to seek work. This negative effect may be due to the small difference between dis-
posable income in the case of accepting work and the level of welfare. The nearly full
deduction of wages earned from the welfare payments actually received is also likely to
weaken the incentive to accept work.
These problems have lead to a series of reform proposals. They run the spectrum from a
reduction in the absolute amount of welfare, the introduction of a negative income tax to
granting wage subsidies in case of long-term unemployment. As alternatives to these
proposals, in a number of OECD countries  novel Welfare to Work programmes have
been conceived and implemented. The US-American Welfare to Work programme to
which the following remarks are confined consists essentially of two elements. On the
one hand, it gives employees in low wage occupations an Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC). This is designed to provide an incentive to take a job. On the other hand, since
1996 the USA have pursued a Workfare model. In contrast to Germany,  welfare is only
granted in return for work performed.  The welfare recipient is required to accept a job
provided, or subsidised, by the public sector.  If this work requirement is not fulfilled,
the claim to welfare lapses. Moreover, the right to receive welfare payments or to take
part in programmes designed to help finding a job is limited to a certain period.
This paper is structured as follows: After a short description of the system of basic so-
cial security in Germany (section 2), the EITC will be analysed (section 3). Then the
American Workfare model as implemented in the State of Wisconsin is introduced
(section 4). An exposition of the principles of employment assistance (section 5) and an
evaluation of Wisconsin’s Workfare Programme (section 6) follow. In the final section,
conclusions for welfare reform in Germany are drawn.
                                                
1  The present study will focus on what is called in Germany social assistance (Sozialhilfe) and
what is commonly referred to in the United States as “welfare”; unemployment benefits are of
course part of the system of social security but will be dealt with in the present paper only in
passing.4
2.  Basic Social Security in Germany
§ 1 of the Federal Law on Social Assistance (Bundessozialhilfegesetz - BSHG) assigns
to the programme of social assistance, as one component of “welfare” is termed in
Germany, the responsibility for ensuring that everyone can  carry on a life in dignity.
Hence the state guarantees the poor an income that corresponds to a “socio-cultural”
existence minimum. Welfare thus serves to safeguard  domestic tranquillity and, at the
same time, to limit crime. It protects people against risks in life and, thus, increases their
willingness to accept risks (Sinn 1996).
Social assistance is the final net in Germany’s system of social security. It becomes
relevant in cases of need, when none of the other systems of protection provide help.
The social assistance legislation obliges every recipient to use his own labour power to
earn his livelihood (§ 18 BSHG). The social assistance organisations shall help to
reintegrate the recipients of social assistance in the labour market. Thus, de jure  there is
already a system designed to help the recipients of social assistance to find work. In
practice, however, up to now little has been done in this direction.
Social assistance consists of recurrent and one-off payments to provide the recipient’s
means of livelihood and to provide assistance in special situations. This last category
includes assistance in the case of illness, integration assistance for disabled persons,
care of chronically ill people, and assistance to the blind. The recipients of this kind of
assistance are generally incapable of work and for this reason are not referred to in what
follows. Payments to provide the means of livelihood (Hilfe zum Lebensunterhalt) are
made when a household’s income is not sufficient to cover a “socio-cultural” existence
minimum. These payments cover the basic needs of everyday life (Grossman 1998).
The basis of calculation of social assistance payments are the so-called normal allow-
ances. They are based on the consumption behaviour of low-income households and are
regularly adjusted in the light of the development of households’ net income and cost of
living developments.  These normal allowances are supplemented by contributions to
cover the cost of lodging and heating. Supplements based on need and one-off payments
for special needs are added. In the first half of 2000 a married couple with two children
(5 and 11 years old) received DM 2353 (€ 1203) monthly. Taking into account the child
allowances to which it was entitled, this family would have had a monthly disposable
income  of DM 2893 (€ 1479) (Peter 2000, p. 59).
At the end of 1998 2.9 million persons, or 3.5% of the total population were receiving
payments to provide the means of livelihood. Of these, 1.77 million were between 15
and 65 years of age. Deducting ill and unemployable persons as well as people with
family responsibilities there was an estimated gross employment potential of 1.35 mil-
lion persons. Deducting again people already in employment and those in training there
remains a net employment potential of 1.10 million persons. Of these 709 000 were
registered as unemployed (Federal Statistical Office 2000, p. 14 f.).
Gross expenditure for social assistance amounted to 45.0 billion DM (23.0 billion €) in
1998 (= 1.2% of GDP). Half of this  (26.6 billion DM or 13.6 billion €) were  payments
to provide the means of livelihood. Between 1980 and 1998 this category of social as-5
sistance payments has grown at 10.9% a year. Owing to this rapid increase, the share of
this category of social assistance in GDP has increased from 0.29% in 1980 to 0.54% in
1998 (Social assistance statistics of the Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs).
In addition to the burden on the state’s budget, social assistance reduces the incentive to
work. This is particularly the case when the difference between earned income and so-
cial assistance is small. The extent of this incentive problem can be quantified by the
wage-assistance differential: it tells us by how much, in percentage terms,  the social
assistance received lies below the disposable income of employed persons in the lowest
wage or salary categories. Abstracting from methodological questions involved in these
calculations (Engels 1999, Hauser 1996), this differential varies according to type of
household, type of employee, branch, and wage or salary group being examined. Tab. 1
gives this differential for an unskilled worker in industry. It shows that the differential is
relatively large for households without children. For households with children, however,
the differential is small.
2 Hence there is little incentive to seek regular work, in particu-
lar if the welfare recipient has the chance to find illegal work in the underground econ-
omy (Feist 2000 a, p. 48 ff).
3
Table 1: Wage Differentials in Germany – 1999
Disposable household









DM (€) DM (€) %
Single person 0 2506 (1281) 1181 (604) 52,9
Married couple 0 3086 (1578) 1874 (958) 39,3
1 3350 (1713) 2421 (1238) 27,7
2 3658 (1870) 2931 (1499) 19,9
3 4056 (2074) 3462 (1770) 14,6
Single parent 1 2646 (1353) 1941 (992) 26,7
2 2925 (1496) 2556 (1307) 12,6
a Unskilled worker in manufacturing, Wage group 3, former FRG, as of 1 July 1999
b Social assistance payments  for means of livelihood
c (Household income – social assistance)/ Household income
Source: Engels 1999.
It is not only the wage differential which reduces the incentive to work: the principle of
the priority of earned income over transfers results in between 85% and 100% of sup-
plementary earned income being deducted from welfare over a broad income span (see
                                                
2   Calculations made with the OECD model for simulating tax and social assistance systems
show that Germany’s wage differential is also relatively small when compared internation-
ally. See Doudeijns et al. 1999
3   Small monetary incentives can, however, be offset by the increase in the subjective satis-
faction that employment provides (Hackenberg and Wagner 1997, p.221).6
figure 1). An increase in a single person’s wage or salary income from DM 200 to DM
500 (€ 102 to € 256)will result in his or her disposable income (i. e. earned income plus
social assistance) growing from DM 1327 to DM 1372 (€ 679 to € 702). In this case the
reduction of benefits at the margin amounts to 85% of the increase in income from
work. Supposing that earnings go up from DM 1100 to DM 1181 (€ 562 to € 604), then
disposable income will remain unchanged, that is to say, in this case the reduction of
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Summing up we can draw the  conclusion that in Germany social assistance reduces the
incentive to work. But what about other countries? Does the new Welfare to Work Pro-
gramme of the United States avoid such disincentives?
3.  The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
When the USA introduced their Welfare to Work policy in 1996, the EITC was already
available as a policy instrument with a generally very positive reputation. The Earned
Income Tax Credit was introduced in 1975.
4 Its goal is to create financial incentives for
low-wage earners and boost their incomes. The programme was modified and consid-
                                                
4  The following remarks describe the programme at the federal level. Wisconsin supplements
the federal EITC. Its  topping up is calculated on the basis of a) 4% for the first child, b)14%
for two children, or c) 43% for three or more children, up to a maximum of $1529.7
erably expanded in 1986, 1990 and 1993. Today, it is the most important measure for
combating poverty in the U. S.
The EITC is a tax credit that is granted under certain circumstances to low-income
households. The beneficiaries are subject to federal income tax. If the tax credit is
higher than the income tax owed, the difference is paid out to the eligible families
(Walker and Wiseman 1997, p. 410). Otherwise it is deducted from the income tax.
EITC is administered by the Internal Revenue Service (Alstott 1995, pp. 533 ff.).
Employment is required for eligibility and the programme is primarily aimed at working
people with children. The amount of tax credit is based on gross earnings. Figure 2 il-
lustrates the three phases of the EITC. In the first phase the increase in the tax credit is
linear to the increase in income. In phase two the tax credit remains constant. And in
phase three it declines until a maximum income is reached. The amount of tax credit
and the income limits differ according to household type. Distinctions are made as to
families with two and more children, families with one child, and people without chil-
dren. The highest credit is given to families with two or more children.
Table 2: United States Federal Earned Income Tax Credit Parameters in 2000













Families with one child 34.0 0 – 6920 2353 15.98 12690 - 27413
Families with two or
more children
40.0 0 - 9720 3888 21.06 12690 - 31152
Families with no chil-
dren
7.65 0 – 4610 353 7.65 5770 - 10380
a Annual amounts for income or EITC assistance.
Source:  H. Johnson, A Hand Up. How State Earned Income Tax Credits Help Working Fami-
lies Escape Poverty, Nov. 1999, p. 44 (http://www.cbpp.org/11-12-99sfp.pdf).8
Figure 2:
The parameters of the EITC in 2000 are shown in Table 2. For example, a family with
two or more children and yearly income between $1 and $9,720 receives a tax credit of
40 cents on every dollar earned. With a gross income of $9,720 the maximum credit of
$3,888 is reached. This remains constant until gross income reaches $12,690. For every
dollar earned above $12,690, the tax credit is reduced by 21 cents. With gross income
reaching $31,152, the tax credit is reduced to zero. In the third phase in which the tax
credit is reduced, the marginal charges on income are higher than the marginal rate of
income tax. In this phase of tax credit reduction it amounts to about 50%, as a rule
(Gern 1996, p. 292; Eissa and Liebman 1995, p. 34).
In 1999, nearly 19 million workers took advantage of EITC. The tax credit amounted to
an average of $1,632 (Economic Report of the President 2001, p. 200).
The objective in granting tax credits is to increase the net incomes in the low-income
range and to increase the labour supply. The income objective is largely achieved. Half
of all EITC payments go to families with incomes below the poverty level. It is esti-
mated that EITC lifted 4.1 million people above the poverty level and made an impor-
tant contribution in preventing child poverty (Economic Report of the President 2001).
The withdrawal rates based on rising incomes as well as a cut-off income level assure
that the benefits go to the deserving. This also keeps the target costs within limits.
5
In contrast to the income effects, the impact of the EITC on the labour supply and on
employment in the low-wage sector is not straightforward. One has to distinguish two
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effects: the encouragement of participation in the labour force and the stimulation of an
additional supply of working hours by those already in employment. To be sure, the
increase in net incomes and the accompanying decrease in net replacement rates create
work incentives and thus encourage participation in the labour force. OECD calcula-
tions show that in 1995 the net replacement rate (with EITC) of a family with two chil-
dren was 63 percent. Without EITC it would have been 97 percent (Doudeijns, Einer-
hard, van de Meerendonk 1999, p. 32).
The effect on the supply of working hours is not so clear. As income increases due to
the EITC, a household can afford to enjoy more leisure and reduce working hours (in-
come effect). On the other hand there are substitution effects caused by changes in rela-
tive prices between leisure and working time (substitution effect). The substitution ef-
fects vary according to the phase of the EITC (see figure 3). In phase I the EITC creates
an incentive for the supply of additional working hours by rewarding them. In phase II
there is no substitution effect. In phase III the EITC creates a disincentive for the supply
of additional working hours by implicitly taxing them. Empirical studies show that the
marginal incentives to work more hours for those already in work are slightly negative
(total effect) (Trabert 1999).
There is thus a trade-off between the effect on participation and the incentives for those
already in work. Empirical studies show that working hours of new entrants tend to
overcompensate slightly the loss of hours due to reductions in working time by those
who are already in the labour force (Ochel 2000, p. 20; Schelkle 2000, p. 10).
Figure 3:
Incentives for Additional Labour Supply due to the EITC
Phase I Phase II Phase III




Income effect negative negative negative
Total effect ? negative negative
Source: Schelkle 2000, p. 10.
Empirical studies show that the effects on the labour supply differ according to the
family situation of the beneficiaries. The EITC has given single mothers a strong incen-
tive to work. There has been little impact on the labour-market participation of married
men, and the participation of married women has declined slightly. The latter effect may
be the result of the fact that the EITC is linked not to individual incomes but to the in-
come of the family, so that because of the high marginal charges on income in the with-
drawal phase it is not beneficial for married women with employed husbands to take on
jobs. The working behaviour of those with jobs is affected in different ways. Whereas
the hours worked by married women, and also by married men, have declined, the hours
of single mothers have remained stable. The conclusion to be made is that employment
levels have been increased by the EITC, average weekly working hours have been low-10
ered and the total number of man-hours worked has been increased slightly (Table 3;
Hotz and Scholz 2000, pp. 28 ff.).
6
Table 3: The Effects of EITC on Labour Market Supply
Holtzblatt, McGubbin,
Gilette (1994)




Increase in the number of employed, slight decrease in hours worked
of previously employed, slight increase in total number of man-hours
worked
Scholz (1996) The decline in hours worked by previously employed is overcompen-
sated by the additional supply of labour resulting from EITC. How-
ever, the net increase is slight.
Eissa, Liebman (1996) Study of the effects of expanding EITC in 1986. Relative to single
women (who were not entitled to EITC), there was a slight increase in
employment of single mothers (+2.8%). Hours worked of previously
employed showed no relative change.
Eissa, Hoynes (1998) Study of the effects of EITC on the supply of labour from married
couples with children. In this connection it is important that the
amount of EITC is not dependent on individual income, but on family
income. It women’s decisions on supplying labour are subsequent to
their husbands’, then owing to the rate of deduction in section III it
may be unattractive for women to offer their labour services. The re-
sult: the supply of labour from men may be virtually unchanged; em-
ployment of women declines by one percentage point; in the phasing
out period of EITC hours worked by women will decrease.
R. M. Blank, D. Card,
Ph. K. Robins (1999)
Increase in employment of single mothers. In phase three of EITC,
women’s volume of labour will decrease due to the higher marginal
tax rate.
B. D. Meyer, D. T.
Rosenbaum (1999)
The increase in employment and of hours worked of single mothers
can be ascribed in large part to the more liberal provisions of EITC and
to a lesser degree to changes in other social policy programmes.
Source: Own compilation.
4.  Major Aspects of the American Workfare Model
In 1996 the USA adapted a thorough welfare reform which obliges welfare recipients to
work in return for transfer payments and which limits the length of time during which
welfare can be paid. This is a reversal of the policy on basic social security which had
been followed up till then (Wolfe 2000, Appendix A). Besides EITC, the distribution of
food stamps to the needy, medical care for the children of poor families and for single
mothers, the pillar of this approach was the programme of Aid to Families with De-
                                                
6 Alongside the income and employment effects the effect of EITC on education and job train-
ing, on saving and on marriage decisions (amongst other thongs) should also be taken into ac-
count. Cf. on these topics the papers presented at the Conference of the Joint Center for Pov-
erty Research at the Northwestern University in Evanston on 7/8 October 1999
(http://www.jcpr.org).11
pendent Children (AFDC). The AFDC programme provided for direct transfer of
money primarily to single mothers. This approach contributed to high divorce rates and
at the same time fostered an excessively high reproduction rate amongst welfare recipi-
ents, many of the births being non-marital; it often led to a situation of dependency
(Haveman and Wolfe 2000, p. 101). Two effects were even more important for our
topic: the implicit encouragement thus given to illicit work and the lack of incentives
encouraging the  acceptance of a regular job.
The AFDC programme’s negative incentives with respect to the family and labour mar-
ket situation made welfare reform necessary. In August 1996 the AFDC programme
was superseded by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act (PRWORA)  which provided for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF). Needy families with children replaced single mothers as the target group for
welfare. In order to overcome the welfare dependency, the legal entitlement to welfare
was eliminated and the willingness to accept work was made a condition for welfare
assistance. The principle of reciprocity was firmly established: the state is obliged to
provide money and jobs and in return the welfare recipient is obliged to work. In addi-
tion, the TANF programme set a limit of five years to welfare benefits during a person’s
whole life. Moreover, the TANF programme gave priority to work over education and
training. And finally the federal government left the decisions on the final shape of the
welfare programme more than in the past up to the individual states. Global subsidies to
the states’ budgets created an incentive for the implementation of welfare reform
(Wiseman 2000; Peter 2001).
The state of Wisconsin has gone the farthest in implementing welfare reform and has
thus remained true to its tradition as a pioneer in welfare policy. This state introduced
its “Wisconsin Works” (W-2) programme in 1997. The strict work orientation of this
programme begins on the first contact between the responsible agency and the needy
person. Where under AFDC, applicants met with a ‚case worker‘ who filled out forms
necessary to establish eligibility and get the right-sized cheques out, under W-2 they
meet with a ‚Financial and Employment Planner‘ at the ‚Job Center‘. This persons ad-
vises them of their work options and helps them make the best choice among these op-
tions.
For those whose job qualifications are the most favourable, an assignment to a regular
job in the private economy is fixed as the goal, and information and advice on how to
find such a job is given. If an applicant is  successful, he or she will be eligible for
EITC. People with fewer skills or work experience are assigned to the ‘Trial Job’ (TJ)
level. Employers, who receive  subsidies, provide full-time jobs which pay at least the
minimum wage. The subsidy can range up to 80 percent of the wage (up to $ 300 per
week). The trial period covers 3 – 6 months. People in this category are again eligible
for EITC. People with even fewer skills and work qualifications will be given a public
service job (CSJ) requiring 40 hours of participation a week (10 hours of which may be
education and training). CSJs provide an opportunity to practise work habits and skills
necessary to succeed in a regular job environment, including punctuality, reliability,
social skills in the work environment and the application of sustained and productive
effort. Those assigned to CSJ are paid $ 673 per month. They are not eligible for EITC.
The least capable applicants are assigned to W-2 transitions. The activities can include12
treatment for alcohol or drug abuse, community rehabilitation programmes, counselling,
and obtaining shelter or safety if a domestic abuse situation is present. Those assigned
to this category receive $628 per month. Again, no EITC support is available (see table
4).
Wisconsin Works’ goal is to have the welfare recipient move up the employment ladder
and to promote this goal the period in each level is limited to twenty-four months. Any-
one exceeding this limit, or the five year limit over one’s entire lifetime, is obliged to
leave the programme, unless certain conditions justifying an exception are met. This is
also the fate of those who owing to their own mistakes fail in any of the programme’s
stages. For less serious infractions they have to accept a reduction in their benefits. At
the present time it is not possible to say how people will be treated when their entitle-
ments expire because the time limits have been exceeded.
























- Work Up to 28 hours Up to 30 hours 40 hours 40 hours
- Education and
training
Up to 12 hours Up to 10 hours Within working
time
-














- Food stamps Yes Yes Yes Yes
- E I T C --Y e s Y e s
- Medicaid child
care
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time limit
- per job - 6 – 9 months 3 – 6 months -
- total 24 months 24 months 24 months -
Source: State of Wisconsin, Department of Workforce Development, Wisconsin Works (W-2).
The costs of W-2T, CSJ and the wage subsidies are met by TANF appropriations; how-
ever, persons who are attempting a trial job are not counted as welfare recipients.
Money is also available for measures such as the provision of subsidies for transport13
costs. In addition, W-2 participants are entitled to other benefits such as food stamps,
Medicaid and child care, as long as they fulfil the requirements for these programmes.
The implementation of the “Wisconsin Works” programme is no longer the sole prov-
ince of the welfare agencies; the 1996 welfare reform put an end to their monopoly po-
sition in this area. Today other private or non-profit organisations are involved in run-
ning Job Centers.
5.  The Principles of Assistance to Work
The following principles are fundamental to the Wisconsin programme:  reciprocity,
selection, time limitation and work first.
The reciprocity principle: whilst in Germany the state pays social assistance to provide
the means of livelihood without any significant corresponding obligation being imposed
on the recipient, this does not hold in the U. S. In Wisconsin the beneficiaries’ obliga-
tion takes the form of work. Refusing to work leads to a forfeiture of the entitlement
(Wiseman 1999). However, there is not only an obligation to work for the recipient,
there is also an obligation on the state to provide work. The logic of “Wisconsin Works”
is very heavily oriented towards reciprocity (Mead 1999).
The selection principle:  the obligation to work goes along with a selection mechanism
which separates the truly needy from the less urgently needy amongst the welfare bene-
ficiaries, and thus reduces abuse. Welfare agencies are often not able to fulfil this task
because they are not sufficiently informed about the degree of neediness of a welfare
recipient. In such a situation the assistance to work can fulfil a useful screening func-
tion.
Suppose we have two groups of welfare recipients who differ with regard to their labour
productivity. Those with the lower productivity are not able on their own to earn an in-
come covering the socio-cultural existence minimum; they receive perfectly properly
welfare. Those with higher productivity could earn an income sufficient to cover this
existence minimum in the private sector. They prefer, however, to abuse their welfare
entitlement, working at the same time illegally. If the principle of granting welfare
without requiring any sort of reciprocal obligation on the part of the recipient is aban-
doned, then the welfare beneficiary will have less time for illegal work. If the principle
of help to work is applied, the welfare recipient will be subject to opportunity costs in
the amount of what he might have earned illegally in the private sector during his
working hours. These opportunity costs are higher for the productive workers than for
the unproductive. It can be demonstrated that the hours of work required as well as the
amount of benefits can be set such that it is more advantageous for the more productive
to move into a regular job. The less productive are better off doing the work assigned to
them and receiving welfare benefits in return (Besley and Coate 1992; Feist 2000 b, p.
106 ff.).
7
                                                
7  If the difference between the needy and those tempted  to abuse the system is not productivity
but preference for leisure, then a different sort of selection occurs. People with a strong pref-14
The introduction of help to work as a selection mechanism is also associated with costs,
such as the state expenditure in connection with organising the help to work pro-
grammes. However, there are compensatory savings which result from the welfare
payments which no longer need to be made to the more productive participants in the
programme. It can be shown that the help to work programme is all the more advanta-
geous for the taxpayer, the smaller the relative number of the less productive and the
greater the difference between their income and the income received by the more pro-
ductive (Besley and Coate 1992, p. 254).
8
The time limitation principle: The 1996 welfare reform introduced the principle that
welfare in the USA will only be made available for a limited period. Wisconsin has
followed the federal government’s lead in limiting participation in these programmes to
a maximum of five years in any one person’s life. On top of this, it imposes a two year
limit for the duration of each step in the employment ladder. This limitation on the du-
ration of welfare reduces the burden of taxation. At the same time, the limitation serves
as an incentive to move up the employment ladder. Particularly strong incentives moti-
vate to accept regular employment. A person who loses all welfare entitlements and has
no wage income will feel a very strong pressure to find a source of income and to offer
his labour services in the labour market. And the incentive to work more hours is
greater than for a welfare recipient working part-time. While the latter has to accept a
loss of welfare benefit if she earns more money, someone who no longer is entitled to
welfare will, of course, not suffer any reduction in benefits. Hence in this case EITC can
exert its full positive effect on net income (Wolfe 2000, pp. 17 ff.). The greater supply
of labour will have an effect on wages and employment. But for those who fail to find
employment in the private sector, the time limitations, if they are applied rigorously,
will lead to renewed impoverishment.
The “work first” principle: a central part of the new welfare strategy is the emphasis on
“work first”. Instead of vocational qualification as a preparation for starting work, pri-
ority is given to getting the participant directly in some form of work. Full time voca-
tional or training programmes stretching over a longer period, intended to achieve a
better paid job, are not a part of the W-2 programme. Welfare recipients are supposed to
begin to work straight away, either in the private sector or in a job in the public sector
such as in the W-2 T or the CSJ programme. If the first alternative is not available, then
work in the public sector is considered the best strategy providing participants an op-
portunity to gather experience. This will make it easier to move to the private sector
later. The on the job training provided in W-2 T or CJS serves as an accelerated prepa-
ration for work in the private sector. It helps to acquire basic qualifications for success
in the labour market such as punctuality and reliability.
                                                                                                                                              
erence for leisure will now renounce their entitlement. This means, however,  that their “so-
cio-cultural” existence minimum will no longer be covered.
8  If the opposite is true then the help to work programme will prove to be very expensive; under
these circumstances the taxpayer would have to prefer the traditional welfare model.15
6. Preliminary results from the Wisconsin Works programme
Since the implementation of the 1996 welfare reform did not begin until 1997 it is still
too early to undertake a comprehensive evaluation of Wisconsin Works. Nevertheless,
some results of the reform are already identifiable.
Firstly, there has been a definite reduction in the number of AFDC/TANF welfare re-
cipients. Figure 4 shows that the number of persons claiming welfare benefits has gone
down in the USA as a whole. This decline is even more pronounced in Wisconsin. After
the welfare reform in 1996 this reduction has accelerated considerably. However, other
factors such as labour market developments in general, the increase in the (legal) mini-
mum wage level etc. have also played an important role (Bell 2001; Council of Eco-
nomic Advisers 1999). The decrease in the number of welfare recipients was also asso-
ciated with a change in their composition. In Wisconsin, in 1994 52% of welfare bene-
ficiaries were non-Whites; in 1998 this group accounted for 83% (Congressional Re-
search Service 2000 a, p. 440). Most of the people still receiving welfare lived in Mil-
waukee.
The number of AFDC/TANF welfare recipients is, however, just a part of the total
number of persons claiming welfare benefits. While cash assistance (AFDC/W-2) has
all but disappeared in Wisconsin, support for the working poor continued and in some
cases has grown. Two new programmes (Kinship Care, SSI Caretaker Supplement)
were created. Supportive services (Child care, Medicaid) which were once targeted to
those on cash assistance, are now targeted to working families. These families are now
eligible for case management and a host of other services aimed at helping parents suc-
ceed and advance in the workforce. If we compare the case counts for all these pro-
grammes from April 1995 to April 2000 (see table 5), the total duplicated case counts
have dropped by just 31% and the total unduplicated case counts by only 3%. The total
number of families served has not changed. But there has been a shift to work-support.
A higher proportion of those receiving help in the year 2000 are working and using
benefits to complement their earnings in the private market (Swartz 2001).
How many of the former recipients of W-2 cash assistance were successful in finding a
job? A study undertaken by the Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development
amongst recipients leaving the programme between September 1997 and September
1999 produced the following results. 75,9% of the 29,077 families, who were not re-
ceiving W-2 cash assistance as of October 1999, left welfare because of employment or
other income. Of the 3180 families, who were receiving W-2 cash assistance again as of
October 1999, 66,7% had a job after leaving welfare. Choosing not to enrol in W-2 or
participate in programme requirements were the most important other reasons for termi-
nation of benefits (Department of Workforce Development 2000).16
Figure 4:
Exits from the social security system were also examined by Cancian et al. Their study
showed that 70% of those single mothers who left the system in the last quarter of 1997
were in regular work one year later. These were the more productive amongst the for-
mer welfare recipients, and preferred a regular job in the context of the Help to Work
programme or at least could be persuaded, more or less voluntarily, to accept such a job.
Of the departees, 30% were not working one year later. These are women who are inca-
pable of work, or have not solved the problem of day care for their children, or have a
strong preference for leisure (Cancian, Haveman, Meyer, Wolfe 2000).
Table 5: Wisconsin Family Case Counts
April 1995 April 2000 % change
Cash assistance (AFDC/W-2) cases 62,752 6,642 -89%
NLRR/Kinship Care cases 5,094 5,905 +16%
C-supp (SSI parents) cases 6,121 5,648 -8%
Case management cases 0 4,032
Family Food Stamps cases 78,904 44,863 -43%
Family Medicaid cases 111,170 101,991 -8%
Child Care cases 9,844 18,784 +91%
Total duplicated case counts 273,885 187,875 -31%
Total unduplicated case count 118,595 114,725 -3%
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Source: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families; 
             Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development, Economic Support Division.17
Not all leavers leave welfare permanently. Of the families who left W-2 between Sep-
tember 1997 and September 1999 nearly 10% received W-2 cash assistance as of Octo-
ber 1999 (Department of Workforce Development 2000). Of the women who left wel-
fare in the last quarter of 1997, 15% were back on welfare a year later. Over all, 25% of
these women claimed some form of welfare at some time during 1998 (Cancian, Have-
man, Meyer, Wolfe 2000, p. 24).
A reduction in the number of people receiving welfare was a goal of the American wel-
fare reform in 1996. That is not, of course, the same thing as improving the well-being
of welfare beneficiaries. The survey carried out by Cancian et al. (2000) shows that this
is not the case with regard to women no longer receiving welfare benefits. As is to be
expected, their earnings have risen
9, but their net income has gone down, since welfare
payments have strongly declined (see figure 5). About 72% of the women have an in-
come below the poverty line. However, it must be borne in mind that these figures do
not take into account other sources of household income such as an additional income
of the head of the household, or income of other household members. Hence the extent
of poverty as measured by household income is very likely lower. In addition, figure 5
lumps together all those leaving welfare programmes, irrespective whether the departee
has accepted work or not. Focussing on average incomes neglects the differences be-
tween the employed and the unemployed, or between the permanently and the precari-
ously employed women; income developments for these different groups will surely
have been very different. The survey of Cancian et al. shows that 31% of the leavers
have a higher income, 12% the same income, and 57% a lower income as compared to
their income as welfare recipients (Cancian et al. 2000, p. 27 ff.).
Despite these qualifications, figure 5 provides some interesting information on the ef-
fects of welfare reform. People’s dependency on welfare has been reduced; more people
are in a position to provide for their means of livelihood through their own work. For
more than half of the former welfare recipients there has, however, been a deterioration
in their income situation, since they no longer receive welfare payments.
10 A beneficiary
of the Wisconsin Works programme is the tax payer; welfare programmes have required
less tax money.
                                                
9  The data refer to mothers’ earning as reported in Wisconsin’s Unemployment Insurance(UI)
system. Cancian et al. (2000) have no information on individuals who have moved out of
the state, no measures of earnings of individuals in Wisconsin who are self-employed or in
other employment not covered by the UI system (covered workers include about 91 percent
of official Wisconsin workers), and no measures of partners’ earnings or other earnings re-
ceived by the individuals. Welfare payments like child care assistance are not included ei-
ther. - On the other hand, these comparisons do not take into account earnings of welfare
beneficiaries from illegal work.
10  The survey of welfare recipients exiting the system between January and March 1998 found
that 37% of leavers were behind in their rent or their house payments (compared to 30% of
welfare recipients), 32% could not buy all the food needed (compared to 22%), and 33%
could sometimes not afford child care needed in order to work (compared to 22%) (GAO
1999, p. 25).18
Figure 5:
Table 6 presents figures on the decline in the burden of welfare. Between 1995 and
1999 expenditure in AFDC/TANF in the USA has gone down by 27.8%; in Wisconsin
the reduction was 41.6%. Given the decline in the number of welfare recipients in Wis-
consin in the same period of 73.6%, the savings in welfare expenditure would have been
much higher than 40%, had welfare expenditure (payments and administrative expense)
per family not increased as strongly as they have. According to the Greenbook 2000
they were an estimated $15,975 (Congressional Research Service 2000a, p. 417);  the
Wisconsin Department of Workforce Development puts the figure at a more modest
$13,500 (Wolfe 2000, p. 27) (Both figures for the state of Wisconsin and for 1999). The
increase in welfare expenditure per recipient is connected with the intensive counselling
and attention given to applicants in the Wisconsin Works programme, but also reflects
the high administrative costs involved in regions where there are few welfare recipients;
the amounts budgeted did not anticipate the drastic decline in the number of
AFDC/TANF recipients. The decline in welfare expenditure, however, is smaller, if the
focus is not on expenditure in AFDC/TANF, but on all welfare programmes (see table
5). Between 1996 and 2000 total spending on welfare declined in Wisconsin by just 4%
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Note: This measure of income includes only gross earnings reported to the 
Wisconsin Unemployment Insurance system, TANF cash payments and Food 
Stamps received in Wisconsin, and estimated Federal EITC and payroll taxes. 
All leavers are included.19
Table 6: Federal and State Expenditures in AFDC/TANF, Fiscal Years 1995 and
1999 (in millions of dollars)
USA Wisconsin
Federal State Total Federal State Total
1995 16,173 13,918 30,091 306 218 524
1999 11,323 10,405 21,728 153 153 306
Percent change -27.8 -41.6
Source: Congressional Research Service 2000 a, p. 407.
Wisconsin Works has only been in operation a short time. Hence important elements of
the programme such as the emphasis on „Work first“ rather than measures to improve
vocational qualification have not as yet been evaluated. Studies done by the Manpower
Demonstration Research Corporation for other states in the US give support to the view
that Work first strategies are superior to strategies that emphasise human capital im-
provement and the removal of obstacles to getting well paid jobs. The Work first ap-
proach leads to quicker re-employment, to higher earnings, and to smaller welfare ex-
penditure. Success, however, requires that welfare agencies at the local level should
adjust themselves to working efficiently with local employers, make available commu-
nal services, establish sensible work contents, and counsel and advise welfare recipients
actively (Wiseman 2000, pp. 218f.).
Aside from remaining uncertainty about the efficiency of the Wisconsin Works pro-
gramme, the question of the intertemporal flexibility of the programme must be raised.
What will be the situation in a recession, when welfare recipients will experience diffi-
culty in finding regular employment? Will a sufficient number of jobs in W-2 T and
CSJ be made available or will the unemployed simply be abandoned to their own de-
vices? It is also an open question how the authorities in Wisconsin will react in cases
when welfare entitlements lapse because the five year period has expired and a person is
still not in regular employment.
11 Will they accept the creation of poverty that is inher-
ent in this situation or will they undertake compensatory action? What will be done for
people who are not capable of productive work or who are uncooperative? No adequate
answers to these questions seem to exist (Ellwood 2000; Haveman and Wolfe 2000).
                                                
11  The first extensions to the 24-month time limit have taken place in the meantime. From
January 1999 through June 2000 of the 1551 W-2 participants who reached 21 months in
one employment category, 206 (13%) had an extension to the 24-month time limit while
1345 (87%) did not have an extension as of June 2000. The most common barriers to self-
sufficiency facing the extension population are depression, various physical barriers and a
lack of education. The top three activities for them were physical rehabilitation, mental
health counselling, and work experience. The top three activities for non-extension popula-
tion were work experience, employment search and adult basic education (Mikelson 2001).20
7. Summary and Conclusions for Germany
Through Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), by making reciprocal work a requirement
for welfare payments, and by setting a limit for maximum duration of receiving welfare,
the US welfare policy creates strong incentives for employment. As a result of more
persons offering labour, and being ready to work at low wages, the new policy also
contributes to a decline in wages in the low wage area (the minimum wage representing
a floor to this process). This increased wage spread raises demand for unskilled labour
and makes it possible for a large part of the unemployed to find regular employment
(Ochel 1998). The declining wage level will also affect employees with low levels of
qualification. Although EITC will help to maintain net income the income of some em-
ployed people will fall below the poverty line.
American welfare reform has reduced dependency on welfare. Wisconsin Works has
drastically reduced the number of AFDC/TANF recipients (but not the number of all
welfare recipients). In Wisconsin, approximately 70% of W-2 welfare leavers are em-
ployed in regular jobs. They are able to live on income they earn and contribute with
their labour supply to GDP. The remaining 30% do not work and the income of these
former welfare recipients is on average lower than under welfare. Many people belong-
ing to this group live in poverty. An undifferentiated view based on averages of all wel-
fare leavers thus merges winners and losers: those who have found employment have
for the most part been able to stabilise or even improve their income situation, whilst
those still without work are the major losers. And the taxpayers are beneficiaries of the
welfare reform, since they must contribute (slightly) less to welfare expenditure.
Wisconsin Works was introduced in a period when the labour market situation was fa-
vourable. A period of recession will be a more stringent test, and the end of the five year
period for welfare entitlements will also pose a challenge.
The U.S.’s Welfare to Work policy provides important insights for the question how
welfare policy in Germany could be reformed in order to reduce dependency of social
assistance and to create incentives to work. The introduction of an Earned Income Tax
Credit can be recommended as a way of raising income after taxes in the low wage
segment. This would increase the difference between net wage income and social assis-
tance and thus create an incentive to find employment.
A requirement calling for reciprocal work as a condition for social assistance would be
welcome. This activates a self selection mechanism amongst welfare recipients which
helps to limit abuses. In addition, welfare recipients are stimulated to greater activity
and their ability to hold a job successfully is improved. In order for all this to happen it
is important that the contents and the quality of the „Help to Work“ programme should
be set adequately, that welfare agencies should be prepared for their new responsibilities
and that accompanying measures such as the establishment of child care facilities
should be taken. It is important to take care that „Help to Work“ should not lead to a
displacement of regular employment. In order to avoid conflicts between creating in-
centives to work on the one hand and fighting poverty on the other, work as a condition
for welfare benefits should only be required from those who are capable of work.21
In reforming Germany’s system of social security two principles should be borne in
mind. First, the level of protection afforded to people with a low level of vocational
qualification is much lower in the USA than in Germany. Owing to existing attitudes on
the principles of a welfare state, the American level of protection cannot be taken as a
standard. This means that social assistance in Germany must be sufficient to cover the
“social-cultural” existence minimum and that the Earned Income Tax Credit must be
more generous than in the USA (Sinn 2000). Second, the transition from the existing
passive system of basic security to an employment oriented system must be carried out
in such a way that friction is avoided as far as possible. This requires a co-ordinated
comportment of employers’ and employees’ and workers’ organisations in connection
with the flexibilisation of wages. At the same time the activity of the various levels of
government with respect to the introduction of EITC and the establishment of a system
of Help to Work must be co-ordinated. But the limits to the state’s ability to deal with
increased financial burdens must be borne in mind.22
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